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COMBATTING THE EXOTIC SPECIES
INVASION: THE ROLE OF TORT LIABILITY
DANIEL P LARSEN*
INTRODUCTION
Present-day island and continental ecosystems began evolving
millions of years before the *human species appeared. These
ecosystems became distinct as they developed in isolation from" one
another, due to natural barriers between them. Within the last 150
years, however, technology has enabled humanity to easily bridge
continents and reach secluded islands. As a-result, modem human
vectors of transport are introducing exotic species' into ecosystems
that have evolved autonomously for millions of years. Often, these
non-native, immigrant species impact wildlife and ecosystem interac-
tions so severely that they may be thought of as deadly "pollutants."
Traditionally, environmental laws have only been concerned with
human management, or mismanagement, of inanimate substances.2
Only recently have environmental laws begun to address the exotic
species problem. Thus far, however, modem federal legislation
enacted in response to damage caused by exotic species inadequately
confronts the threat.
A viable solution to encourage transporting behavior which
prevents exotic introductions may be based upon common law public
nuisance and strict liability. Tort liability provides more flexibility to
adapt to changing circumstances than rigid statutes and allows the
* Daniel P. Larsen currently clerks for the Honorable Robert E. Jones of the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon. He received his J.D. from Northwestern School
of Law at Lewis and Clark College, and his B.S. from University of Wisconsin-Madison. The
author thanks Professor James Huffman for his insightful comments, and expresses deep
gratitude to Antonia DeMeo who performed abundant onerous tasks in connection with this
article. Finally, the author dedicates this article to his mother, who endured countless late nights
editing last-minute grade school and high school research papers so they could be completed on
time.
1. The term "exotic species" refers to plant and animal species which are found outside
of their native habitat.
2. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 1983 &
Supp. 1995); Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C.A. §§' 2601-2692 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1995); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671q (West 1983 & Supp. 1995).
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transporter to choose the most efficient method to avoid liability.
Therefore, adaptable tort principles may represent the best means by
which our most valuable resources, our ecosystems, can be protected
from destructive exotic species.
This Article advocates the use of liability-based principles from
nuisance law to combat the tide of exotic introductions. Section I
details the destructive power of some exotic species on non-native
ecosystems and illustrates, the threat posed by future introductions.
Section II discusses the present federal regulatory approach to exotic
species introductions. This section includes both indirect and direct
federal legislation to combat exotics, as well as an administrative
reaction to the exotics problem. Section III examines how tort
liability, specifically the law of public nuisance, can be applied to
environmental harms. Lastly, Section IV analyzes each element
necessary for a public nuisance suit and concludes by illustrating how
public nuisance law 'provides a foundation which can be modified to
effectively confront the exotic species threat.
I. THE INVASION
For years, complex ecosystems have been victims of a silent
assault caused by the introductions of exotic species. "Ecologists have
chronicled such introductions for decades ... [b]ut in recent years,
they have approached the exotic species problem with new urgency,
increasingly alarmed at what invasion experts such as Ted Case of the
University of California, San Diego, call 'the homogenization of the
world."'" To understand why ecosystems are so vulnerable, it is
-helpful to trace their development.
Two-hundred and fifty million years ago, the Earth's entire land
mass consisted of a single giant continent that geologists refer to as
Pangaea.4 Fifty million Years later, the continents, began to break
apart and drift towards their present locations, isolating species of
plants and animals on the different land masses.' Once isolated, they
evolved in response to their changing habitat and companion species.
About 500 years ago, however, this autonomous evolution ended in
many regions as humans started to reconnect the pieces of Pangaea
through shipping and, more recently, air travel.6
3. -Elizabeth Culcotta, Biological Immigrants Under Fire, SCIENCE 1444, 1444 (1991).
4. David Yount, The Eco-Invaders, EPA JOURNAI, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 51, 51.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Consequently, the natural barriers that developed over millions
of years are being broken down as the descendants of thespecies of
Pangaea are reunited. These reunions allow exotic species to live
within new ecosystems that may not have the same natural restraints,
such as predation, competition for food, and disease, which exist in
the exotic species' indigenous habitat.7 Absent nature's checks on an
exotic species' growth and reproduction, the exotic species population
is capable of growing exponentially within the new ecosystem.
Prolific exotic species typically transform unprotected ecosystems by
predation, competition, altering landscapes, or a combination of the*
three.'
The European wild pig illustrates the effect one species can have
upon a nonindigenous habitat. The European wild pig was imported
into North Carolina in 1912 by a wealthy sportsman for hunting.9
Facing few predators, the boars spread through the 520,000 acres
comprising the Great Smoky Mountains National Park.", The
omnivorous boars eat anything smaller than themselves, such as roots,
bulbs, flowers, frogs, snakes, rodents, ground-dwelling birds, and
eggs." Armed with powerful, sharply-edged hoofs for digging and
an indiscriminate appetite, the boars have wreaked havoc on the
park's ecosystem by predation, competition, and habitat modification.
In 1986, the National Park Service attempted to eradicate the boars;
however, at the cost of $175,000 to $225,000 per year, the Park
Service may have to abandon its efforts because of insufficient
funds. 2 Thus, the boar population could be left to multiply unre-
strained. 3
7. Id. at 52-53. However, not every introduction of an exotic species results in catastrophe;
only about 10% of established immigrants have major effects. Culcotta, supra note 3, at 1446.
8. Culcotta, supra note 3, at 1444.
9. Michael Lemonick, Invasion of the Habitat Snatchers; Exotic Plants and Animals Are
Ruining the Nation's Wilderness, TIME, Sept. 10, 1990, at 75.
10. Gregory Bald, Rooting Out Wild Pigs' Mischief in Great Smoky Mountains, L.A. TIMES,
July 21, 1992, at A5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Similar patterns of introduction and destruction have been seen with the intentional
introduction of mountain goats to.Washington's Olympic National Park. Charles Bergman, The
Mountain Goat Foments Trouble in t Fragile Paradise, SMrHSONiAN, Aug. 1984, at 102, 103.
Additionally, since their initial introduction into the Hudson River in 1830, European Carp
have prospered at the expense of the native aquatic ecosystems by removing vegetation and
stirring up bottom sediment. Jon Luoma, Boon to Anglers Turns into a Disaster for Lakes and
Streams, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1992, at C4.
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A more recent unintentional introduction is the zebra mussel,
which has become infamous in the Great Lakes area. In the mid-
1980's, the mussel hitched a ride from Europe in the ballast water of
ocean-going ships. 4 In the absence of their natural predators and
parasites in Europe, 5 the mussel proliferated because it reproduces
with incredible swiftness. 6 As a result, its population has become
so great that densities have reached more than 700,000 zebra mussels
per square meter in Lake Erie, thus covering nearly every solid
underwater object, especially water intake pipes.' Furthermore, the
huge number of mussels deplete the water of phytoplankton,
microscopic plants which are the building blocks of the food chain."8
By removing the phytoplankton, the mussel sends shockwaves through
the entire ecosystem as it effectively out-competes all other species for
food.' 9
Most importantly, the zebra mussel has brought the topic of
exotic species into the limelight.' It is unique because it caused
unprecedented economic damage. The cost of cleanup and re-design
of piping for utilities that rely on the Great Lakes for water is
expected to be around $5 billion for the decade. 2' Such costs have
alerted people to the emerging exotic threat to ecosystems, particular-
14. Matthew Hart, Invasion of the Zebra Mussels, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1990, at 81.
15. Yount, supra note 4, at 51-52.
16. The mussel expends half its body weight in gametes during spawning. Culcotta, sjupra
note 3, at 1447. Furthermore, unlike native mussel larvae, which disperse themselves by
attaching to fish, zebra mussel larvae are veligers, meaning that each possesses a clump of cilia,
allowing them to swim freely and ride the currents. Hart, supra note 14, at 81. Ironically, the
environmental clean-up of harbors starting in the 1970's in both Europe and North America may
be partly responsible for the mussel infestation because it provided the requisite water quality
for habitability. Hart, supra note 14, at 81.
17. Carolan E. Malia, An Environmental and Ecological Report: The Invasion of the Zebra
Mussel and its Impact on Utilities, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2, 1990, at 43, 43. The water
treatment system in Monroe County, Michigan was reportedly shut down because of intake pipes
clogged with a combination of zebra mussels and ice. Jeffrey Ghannam & Robert Musial, Ice
Blocks Lake Erie Intake, Cutting Water in Monroe County, DET. FREE PRESS, Dec. 16,1989, at
1A.
18. It is estimated that zebra mussels filter all the water in Lake St. Clair (located between
Lake Erie and Lake Huron) several times daily. Yount, supra note 4, at 52.
19. For instance, zooplankton feed on phytoplankton, larval and small fish feed on
zooplankton, and larger predatory fish prey upon the smaller fish. Therefore, with less
phytoplankton, the ecosystem's chain links are removed and species collapse. See Larry Green,
Invasion of the Zebra Mussels Threatens U.S. Waterways, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15,1990, at Al, A15
("If 50% of the [food] is being consumed by the zebra mussel, something has to be starving")
(quoting ecologist Ronald W. Griffiths).
20. Malia, supra note 17, at 43.
21. Malia, supra note 17, at 44.
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ly in light of the opening of new trade routes with China and the
increasing number of Eastern European ships entering the North
American ecosystem.'
Perhaps no American ecosystem has felt the scourge of exotic
species more severely than the Hawaiian Islands. "Hawaii is Earth's
most isolated archipelago."'  For 70 million years the Hawaiian
ecosystem proved nearly inaccessible.24 Ecologists estimate that a
new species entered its ecosystem only once every 100,000 years,
which allowed significant time for adjustment.' The absence of
predators and mammals has contributed to the lack of developed
defense mechanisms among Hawaii's native species.O The Islands
evolved with only one land mammal, a cave dwelling bat, and the
predators at the top of the food chain were wolf spiders and carabid
beetles.27 The lack of predatory animals allowed birds to become
flightless or ground-nesters, and to produce only one chick per
reproduction cycle.' Moreover, thorns, thistles, toxins, and odors
employed by plants to protect themselves from herbivorous mammals
slowly disappeared.29
The introduction of the rat in Hawaii by early American settlers
and the subsequent introduction of the mongoose in 1883, to eradicate
the rats, were two of the first mammalian invaders." However, since
the rat was nocturnal and the mongoose diurnal, the two mammals
compounded their damaging effect on the environment by eating
native bird eggs and ground-nesting birds.3' Nearly forty percent of
the native birds have become extinct.32
22. Also, larger and faster ships make the journey less taxing to ballast water hitchhikers.
Marguerite Holloway, Musseling In, Scr. AM., Oct. 1992, at 22, 22. According to the
Transportation Institute in Washington, D.C., the international fleet consists of 39,896 merchant
vessels. Id.
23. Carol Ezzell, Strangers in Paradise. Alien Species Disrupt the Ecology of Hawaii, 142
ScI. NEWS 314, 314 (1992).
24. I.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Maura Dolan, Sad Aloha to Native Species, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1990, at Al, A26.
29. See id. ("the thorns on the raspberry bush turned to soft fuzz... [and] [t]he native mint
lost its protective odor").
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Another troublesome introduction of an exotic species occurred
in 1950, when an exotic snail was introduced in Hawaii to control
another alien garden pest.33 However, the exotic snail preferred the
taste of native Oahu tree snails and decimated the population.Y3
Unintentional introductions of exotics via airplanes, products, and
people entering Hawaii every day are also frightening. An example
is the brown tree snake which travels in the wheel wells of airplanes
from Guam and finds easy prey among the native birds and their
eggs. 5 Other examples include insects which are imported into the
Hawaiian ecosystem through the mail and shipments of fruit. 6 One
such insect, the yellow-jacket wasp, has devastated the fruit fly
population. Fruit fly larvae help recycle forest nutrients by eating
decaying fruit and plant matter, while the adults play a role in
pollination.37 The .effect of the elimination of this species upon
Hawaii's ecosystem is unknown. With regard to the loss of species
resulting from exotic introduction, Kelvin Taketa, the Nature
Conservancy vice president who directs the organization's Hawaiian
program, aptly stated, "you just don't know if you have pulled the
thread that unravels the tapestry.
38
II. EXISTING APPLICABLE LAW
No single federal statute regulates all exotic species introductions
into the United States. Indirect regulation of certain exotic species
and their host vectors began at the turn of the century with the
enactment of the Lacey Act.39 But it was not until the early 1990's
that federal law expressly controlled specific types of introductions of
33. Ezzell, supra note 23, at 316.
34. Ezzell, supra note 23, at 316.
35. Ezzell, supra note 23, at 314. The snake is also an exotic to Guam and has eaten nearly
every bird on the island.' There are up to 6000 snakes per square mile on the island. Sy
Montgomery, Guam's Silent Enemy, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1989, § 2, at 3.
36. Ezzell, supra note 23, at 315; Ian Anderson, Pests in the Post Threaten Crops in Hawaii,
NEW ScamEnsT, Nov. 21, 1992, at 10,10. Of the 2500 species of insects in Hawaii, roughly 600
were introduced by humans. Ezzell supra note 23, at 315.
37. Ezzell, supra note 23, at 315.
38. Dolan, supra note 28, at A26.
39. Act of May 25, 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187, pdrtially repealed by the Lacey Act
Amendments, infra note 45 (now codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3371-3378 (West 1985 & Supp.
1993)).
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nonindigenous species with an awareness of the deleterious impacts
of exotic immigrants on native ecosystems.'
A. Indirect Responses
1. Lacey Act. Although the original Lacey Act was enacted
primarily for the agricultural industry, it did affect exotic introductions
within the United States' The Act enlarged the powers of the
Department of Agriculture to prohibit the transportation in interstate
commerce of game killed in violation of local law. Section 2 of the
Act prohibited the importation of "any foreign wild animal or bird"
without a permit, including the importation of the mongoose, fruit
bat, English sparrow, starling, and any other bird or animal prohibited
by the Secretary of Agriculture in "the interest of agriculture or
horticulture."42 Additionally, the Act declared it illegal to transport
any dead animal thit was prohibited under section 2, and required
packages containing dead animals to be "plainly and clearly
marked."43
The language of the Act suggests that Congress' primary interest
in exotics was their affect on the agricultural industry, rather than on
the larger surrounding ecosystems.' Indeed, Congress sought to
remove native species which threatened agriculture. Lacking modem
knowledge regarding ecology and exotics, it is not surprising that the
original Lacey Act was unconcerned with impacts on native ecosys-
tems which were unrelated to agriculture.
In 1981, Congress broadened the Lacey Act to combat the illegal
trade of fish and wildlife and their parts and products.4' The new
amendments imposed stiffer civil and criminal penalties for the
import, export, transport, sale, or purchase of fish, wildlife, or plants
in violation of United States or Tribal Law.' However, the new
amendments still fell short of significantly affecting the introduction
of exotic species.
40. Beginning with the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of
1990, infra note 78.
41. 31 Stat. 187.
42. 31 Stat. 187, 188 § 2.
43. 31 Stat. 187, 188 §§ 3-5.
44. 31 Stat. 187.
45. Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-79, 1981 U.S.S.C.A.N. (97 Stat.) 1748.
46. 16 U.S.C.A. § 3373(a)(1), (d)(1) (1988) (assessing maximum civil fine of $10,000 for
failure to exercise due care and criminal penalties up to $20,000 and five years in prison for
knowing violations).
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The changes to the Lacey Act fell short for two reasons. First,
the regulations employ the "dirty list" method to designate harmful
species that may not be imported, whereby the Lacey Act instructs
the Secretary to list as prohibited only those species demonstrated to
be "injurious."' 7 The "clean list" method, whereby the Secretary
lists only acceptable species which can be imported, would be far
better at preventing exotics from damaging non-native ecosystems.48
The advantage of the "clean list" method is that the burden is placed
on the possessor/transporter of the species to show that any unlisted
species is not injurious.' In contrast, the "dirty list" method
adopted'by the Secretary places the burden on the Secretary to show
that a species is harmful when it is not on the list. However, often
the harm is not known until after the species is introduced, when it is
too late.50
Although the "clean list" burden of demonstrating a species to
be innoxious may appear too demanding, a reasonable standard which
balances the value of minimizing adverse impacts on native ecosys-
tems and the proposed benefit of the introduction could be used. 1
The ultimate benefit of the "clean list" approach is not necessarily to
make it more difficult to introduce exotic species, although greater
difficulty would result if a high standard was adopted, but rather to
place the duty of identifying undesirable introductions on the affected
parties. In comparison to federal'bureaucrats, these paities have an
incentive to act more swiftly to demonstrate that the balance weighs
47. 18 U.S.C.A. § 42 (1988). The Lacey Act makes it unlawful to import or possess the
zebra mussel or brown tree snake, as well as any other species of mammal, bird, fish, amphibian,
or reptile which the Secretary of the Interior deems to be "injurious." Id. § 42(a)(1). "Injurious"
is not specifically defined. Instead, section 42(a)(1) states, "[the importation of species] which
the Secretary of Interior may prescribe by regulation to be injurious to human beings, to the
interests of agriculture, horticulture, forestry, or to wildlife or the wildlife resources of the
United States, is hereby prohibited." Id. Apparently, the exotic need only have a minimal
negative impact for the Secretary to prohibit its introduction.
48. Julianne Kurdila, The Introduction of Exotic Species into the United States: There Goes
the Neighborhoodl, 16 ENV. AFF. 95, 104-105 (1988); George Laycock, The Importation of
Animals, SIERRA, Apr. 1978, at 20, 22 (inset box).
49. Laycock, supra note 48, at 23.
50. Laycock, supra note 48, at 23.
51. See, ag., Zebra Mussels and Exotic Species: Hearings on H.R. 4214 Before the Subcomm.
on Oceanography and Great Lakes, the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and
the Environment, and the Subcomn. on the Coast Guard and Navigation, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
36-37 (1990) [Hereinafter House Hearings] (Constance B. Harriman, Assistant Secretary for Fish
and Wildlife and Parks, Department of the Interior, discussing strategies for preventing
undesirable intentional introductions).
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in favor of certain exotic introductions. Furthermore, a "clean list"
approach would result in transporters who are sufficiently familiar
with an exotic such that they may anticipate some negative impacts
upon native species.
The second major inadequacy of the Lacey Act is that it only
applies to intentional introductions, or introductions where the person
did not exercise due care in knowing that prohibited fish or wildlife
were being transported. Consequently, the Act fails to encourage
people or businesses to use extra caution to prevent non-negligent,
unintentional introductions of exotic species.
2. Endangered Species Act. The Endangered Species Act5
2
(ESA) indirectly affects exotic species introductions by protecting
threatened and endangered species and their habitats. 3 The purpose
of the ESA is to "provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved."'54 Section 9 of the ESA prohibits the "taking" of a
threatened or endangered species within the United States.'5 The
ESA's definition of "take" includes "harm,"56 which is defined by
the Secretary of the Interior as "an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife ... , [or involves] significant habitat modification or degrada-
tion where [the action] actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or
sheltering."5' Since exotics alter behavioral patterns (like feeding)
of native species, their introduction could be considered harmful to
threatened or endangered species within the meaning of the ESA.
The Ninth Circuit has dealt with the issue of whether injurious
effects by exotic species are considered "takings" under the ESA. In
Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources,8 the court of
appeals found that non-native feral goats and sheep maintained by the
State in the endangered Palila's habitat (the mamane-naio forest in
52. Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
53. ESA, 16U.S.C. § 1531(b). The "threatened" or "endangered" wildlife and plant species
are listed in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regulations. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11-17.12 (1993).
54. ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
55. ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). Section 11 assesses civil penalties of up to $25,000 for
knowing violations or criminal penalties of up to $50,000 and one year in prison for knowing
violations. ld. § 1540.
56. 1& § 1532(19).
57. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c) (1993).
58. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Nat. Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Hawaii) had "a destructive impact on the mamane-naio ecosystem...
[by feeding on] mamane leaves, stems, seedlings, and sprouts."S9
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding of
a taking and ordered the goats and sheep in the Palila's habitat
removed. 60
Seven years later, after the Secretary of the Interior promulgated
the definition of "harm," the Ninth Circuit was confronted again with
the issue of destruction of the Palila's habitat by an exotic species.61
However, this time the Sierra Club sought the removal of mouflon
sheep, introduced by the Department of the Interior in the 1960's for
the enjoyment of sport hunters.' Like the goats and sheep in the
first two Pala. cases, the mouflon sheep also fed on the mamane
trees. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's finding that the
Secretary's definition of "harm" included habitat modification that
could potentially result in the palila's extinction.' Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order to remove the
mouflon sheep.' Consequently, the Sierra Club's victory provides an
example of how the ESA may combat habitat and ecosystem
degradation by an exotic species where a listed species6 is potential-
ly threatened.66
The Palla cases suggest how the ESA can provide a cause of
.action for individuals6' to enjoin the introduction, and enforce the
59. Id. at 496.
60. Id. at 498.
61. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Nat. Resources, 852 F.2d 1106'(9th Cir. 1988).
62. Id. at 1107.
63. Id. at i108-09.
64. 1d. at 1110.
65. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11-17.12 (1993).
66. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of "harm" under the ESA regulations
has not been universally accepted. Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit by a two-to-one
panel reversed its own prior decision and invalidated the regulation defining "harm" to include
habitat modification. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d
1463, 1465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994), modifying 1 F.3d 1 (D.C.Cir. 1993), reh'g denied., 30 F.3d 190
(D.C.Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995). The court explained that "harm" must be
given a meaning consistent with the accompanying words in the statute. The statute defines a
"take" to include activities that "'harass, 'harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture,
or collect' the listed species." 17 F.3d at 1465 (quoting ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988)).
Therefore, the court concluded that "the nine verbs accompanying 'harm' all involve a
substantially direct application of force, which the Service's concept of forbidden habitat
modification altogether lacks." Id. However, the validity of this holding remains uncertain
because'the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 6,1995. 115 S.Ct. 714.
67. ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988). The citizen suit provision of the ESA allows any
person to commence a civil suit of his or her own behalf to enjoin any person who is in violation
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removal, of exotic species where the habitat of a threatened or
endangered species is being significantly damaged. But this cause of
action is quite limited because the Act applies only when the exotics
either jeopardize ecosystems that house endangered or threatened
species, or prey on the endangered species themselves. However, the
ESA does not preempt suits to enforce rfghts under other statutes or
common law.
B. Direct Administrative Response - Executive Order 11,987
The first administrative attempt to limit exotic introductions was
adopted by President Carter in 1977 through Executive Order
11,987.1 The Order directed executive agencies to limit the intro-
duction of "exotic species ' 69 into natural ecosystems on lands and
waters owned or held by the federal government. ° Furthermore, the
Secretary of the Interior was instructed to promulgate rules to
effectuate the goals of the Order and to designate specific exotic
species which would not have an adverse impact on native ecosys-
tems. 71 However, the Order was little more than an empty promise
because the authorized guidelines were neither finalized nor imple-
mented.72 Consequently, Executive Order 11,987 never played a role
in the legal battle against exotic pollution.
C. Direct Legislative Responses
Recently, Congress recognized that the exotic species problem
deserved its unabated attention. Accordingly, Congress enacted the
Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of
19903 and, more recently, the Alien Species Prevention and En-
forcement Act of 1992!7 These Acts directly confront the exotic
of the Act. Id § 1540(g)(1)(A). However, the Supreme Court recently held that persons suing
under the ESA must establish the minimum requirements of constitutional standing: injury-in-
fact, causation, and redressibility. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
68. 3 C.F.R. 116 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (West Supp. 1994).
69. Executive Order 11,987 defines "exotic species" as "all species of plants and animals
not naturally occurring, either presently or historically, in any ecosystem of the United States."
Id § 1(c).
70. Id. § 2(a).
71. Id § 3.
72. Kurdila, supra note 48, at 103 (citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., POLICIES FOR
REDUCING RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH INTRODUCTIONS OF AQUATIC ORGANISMS (1987)).
73. Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act (NANPCA), 16 U.S.C.
§§ 4701-4751 (West Supp. 1992).
74. Alien Species Prevention and Enforcement Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3015 (West Supp. 1993).
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species problem by attempting to prevent exotic introductions and
provide federal funding to study the problem.
1. Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act
of 1990. In 1990, Congress acknowledged that the Great Lakes
ecosystem was being uncontrollably altered by the infestation of zebra
mussels.7 In response, Congress passed the Nonindigenous Aquatic
Nuisance Prevention and Control Act.76  Although the Act was
primarily adopted as a reaction to zebra mussel infestation, its
provisions were designed to address unintentional introductions of all
nonindigenous aquatic species.' The Act requires all vessels to
either exchange ballast water far enough from the "waters of the
United States" in order to eliminate the spread of "aquatic nuisance
species," or use an "environmentally sound alternative" approved by
the Secretary.78 The Act also assesses civil penalties of up to $25,000
for each day of violation and a criminal penalty of a class C felony.79
Finally, the Act created a Task Force' to develop a program, based
on biological studies, to combat the introduction of exotic species.81
In 1993, the Coast Guard adopted guidelines which require either the
discharge of ballast water in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 2
75. S. REP. No. 523, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6455,
6456 [Hereinafter S. REP. No. 523]. Although Congress noted the adverse impacts on the native
ecosystem, its first stated concern involved the economic losses estimated at reaching $5 billion
dollars by the year 2000. Id. Without the huge economic losses at stake, it seems unlikely that
Congress would have responded so swiftly to the zebra mussel infestation.
76. NANPCA, supra note 73.
77. S. REP. No. 523, at supra note 75, at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6457.
78. NANPCA, 16 U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1992). The term "aquatic nuisance
species" is defined as "nonindigenous species that threaten the diversity or abundance of native
species or the ecological stability of infested waters. .. ." Id. § 4702(2). The term
"nonindigenous species" is defined as "any species or other viable biological material that enters
an ecosystem beyond its historic range, including any such organism transferred from one
country into another." Id. § 4702(9). An "environmentally sound" alternative includes
"methods... that minimize adverse impacts to the structure and function of an ecosystem...
Id. § 4702(7).
79. NANPCA, 16 U.S.C. § 4711(c),(d).
80. NANPCA, 16 U.S.C. § 4721(b). The Task Force is comprised of the Director of the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere,
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Commandant of the U.S. Coast
Guard, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, and any other federal agency head designated by
the Director of U.S.F.W.S. and the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere.
Id.
81. NANPCA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4712-4722.
82. Proclamation No. 5030, 3 C.F.R. 22 (1984), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 1453 (1988). The
EEZ is an area established by Presidential Proclamation Number 5030, dated March 10, 1983.
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in water at least 2000 meters deep, the retention of ballast water on
board the vessel, or any other method approved by the Commandant
of the Coast Guard. 3
However, the Act is an inadequate Congressional response for at
least two reasons. First, the Act is restricted to aquatic nuisances
(except for the brown tree snake),' though equally significant
threats to terrestrial ecosystems also exist. Second, the Act lacks a
citizen-suit provision and, thus, is enforced solely through executive
agencies. Consequently, citizens or organizations who use the affected
ecosystems have no recourse within the statute to protect their
ecosystems or receive remedies for ecological destruction.
Nevertheless, this legislation suggests that Congress has started
to recognize the looming threat to native ecosystems from uninten-
tional exotic introductions. Furthermore, the Act directs the Task
Force to both discover how aquatic nuisance species are introduced
and disseminate information regarding its findings.' These findings
should prove helpful in future legislation concerning this problem.
Therefore, while not a comprehensive solution, the Nonindigenous
Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act accomplishes much as
an initial attempt at dealing with the exotic threat.
2. Alien Species Prevention and Enforcement Act of1992. Most
recently, Congress has focused on the detrimental effect of exotic
species in the Hawaiian Islands by passing the Alien Species
Prevention and Enforcement Act of 1992.6 The Act prohibits the
mailing of exotic plants and animals,' and is implemented by
allowing the inspection of Hawaiian-bound mail suspected of
containing exotic species.' While this is but a modest attempt at
The EEZ extends from the base line of the territorial sea of the United States seaward to a
distance of 200 miles. Id
83. Ballast Water Management for Control of Nonindigenous Species, 33 C.F.R.
§ 151.1510(a) (1994).
84. The Act also directs the Task Force to develop a program to control the brown tree
snake in Guam. NANPCA, 16 U.S.C. § 4728.
85. NANPCA, 16 U.S.C. § 4722.
86. Alien Species Prevention and Enforcement Act of 1992,39 U.S.C. § 3015 (West Supp.
1993).
87. Id § 3015(a). The animals regulated by the Act are referred to as "injurious animals,"
defined as those animals "the importation orshipment of which is prohibited [by the Lacey Act].
." Id. These animals are listed in the "dirty list" regulations, which designate the prohibited
species under the Lacey Act. See 50 C.F.RL § 16 (1993).
88. Alien Species Prevention Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-393, § 631(b)(1)(B), 106 Stat.
1774, 1775 (1992) (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 3015 (Supp. 1994)). See Also Carol
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resolving the Hawaiian problem, the Act also contains a beneficial
assessment aspect. Specifically, a section of the Act directs the
Secretary of Agriculture, in cooperation with the Secretary of the
Interior, Postal Service, and State of Hawaii, to determine the extent,
and means of exotic species introductions. 9 The results of this
assessment will be reported to Congress.' °
The Act's impact upon the intentional introduction of exotic
species into Hawaii has yet to be realized. Despite its limited
.application, if the Act proves effective in Hawaii, it could stimulate
related legislation for nationwide mail service. Unfortunately, the
success of the Act will probably be limited as it uses the flawed "dirty
list" approach from the Lacey Act for designating "injurious animals."
Nevertheless, like the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance and
Prevention Act, the Alien Species Prevention and Enforcement Act
illustrates the growing concern over exotic invasions. Moreover, the
Act is beneficial because it Will generate information as to how exotic
species immigrate to Hawaii. Hopefully, the legislative wheel has
merely begun to roll, and the increasing publicity of exotic-caused
environmental damage will accelerate the legislative process.
D. The Failings of Statutory Approaches
This federal statutory system is riddled with cavernous holes in
its application to exotic introductions. All the statutes discussed
above seek to prohibit activities involving exotic species by enjoining
the activity and imposing civil or criminal penalties on the violator,
but only the ESA allows citizen enforcement. Furthermore, the
above-referenced statutes coerce conduct by either commanding a
course of action or imposing penalties, or both, rather than imposing
a liability scheme on parties responsible for harmful exotic introduc-
tions. Command and control regulation may be effective in some
kinds of exotic interference situations, but -a liability system will be
more effective in others.
There are three types of exotic interferences with native
ecosystems. One interference is the intentional introduction of exotic
species, such as the introduction of the carp into U.S. rivers by the
United States Fish Commission.91 Another is the intentional
Ezzell, There Ought to be a Law, 142 Sci. NEWS 316 (1992).
89. Pub. L. No. 102-393 § 631(c)(3), 106 Stat. 1774, 1776.
90. Id.
91. Culcotta, supra note 3, at 1444.
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importation of captive exotics that accidently escape into the
ecosystem. These include, for example, pets that are brought into an
area and are later released or escape. Finally, interference is caused
when exotic species are unintentionally introduced in connection with
the operation and ownership of property. For instance, transporting
activity carried the zebra mussel in the ballast water of ships, insects
in crates of fruit, and the brown tree snake in wheel wells of
airplanes&'
Intentional introductions can be effectively regulated by statutes
which directly influence decisions to introduce exotics. The Lacey
Act, which prohibits the importation of listed species, is one such
statute.93 By imposing civil and criminal penalties for importing
listed plants and animals, the Lacey Act directly influences people's
behavior and encourages them to refrain from knowingly- importing
prohibited species.94
Similarly, exotics intentionally imported for the use and enjoy-
ment of people, and accidentally introduced into the native ecosystem
by private individuals, are also more effectively controlled by
regulation than by public nuisance liability.95 There are two reasons
for this. First, private accidental introductions of pets are often,
individually, too minor and unnoticeable to effectively expose the
owners to public nuisance suits. Secondly, case law suggests that the
pet industry, as an importer, could not be held liable for causing a
public nuisance because of the acts of its customers.96 Therefore, to
limit accidental introductions derived from individual purchases of
imports, the appropriate remedy is proper regulation of importing and
application of the Lacey Act.
92. Supra notes 14, 35, and 36, and accompanying text.
93. Supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. Recall that the effectiveness of the Lacey
Act in preventing introductions of new species is highly questionable due to its use of the "dirty
list" approach. Supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
94. See eg., 16 U.S.C. §3373(a),(d) (1988) (penalty provisions).
95. However, public nuisance liability may provide extra protection against exotic
introductions in cases like Colorado Div. of Wildlife v. Cox, 843 P.2d 662 (Colo. App. 1992).
See infra note 153-158 and accompanying text.
96. See, &g., City of Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec., 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 1989)
(finding PCB*manufacturer not liable for public nuisance because manufacturer did not retain
right to control PCB's beyond point of sale); Quinnett v. Newman, 568 A.2d 786, 789 (Conn.
1990) (finding vendor not liable for public nuisance for serving liquor to person who later
operated a motor vehicle).
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However, statutes like the Lacey Act may provide an inadequate
result (or no result since there is no citizen suit provision). Public
nuisance law may be used as a supplement to these statutes in order
to abate interferences with public domain ecosystems caused by
intentional introductions that result in an accidental release. For
example, in 1990, the City of Torrance, California sued Mobil Oil to
require it to update its pollution controls.98 An attorney for the city
stated that the nuisance action was its only recourse because
"regulatory agencies can't levy fines big enough to get Mobil to
stop."99 Therefore, where Congress fails to provide an adequate
remedy, common law may fill in the gaps by granting relief when
interferences with public rights become unreasonable.
Public nuisance liability provides the best solution to prevent
totally unintentional introductions. Public nuisance liability is most
effectively applied as a primary means of control where the exotic
introduction unintentionally emanates from the use and ownership of
property. But citizens could seek redress for the destruction of their
ecosystems by applying tort law to both intentional and unintentional
exotic introductions.
III. BENEFITS OF TORT SCHEME BASED ON NUISANCE LAW
Instead of piecemeal, narrow legislation, a modified tort system
could provide incentives for exotic-introducing parties to take more
protective nieasures to prevent themselves from becoming the vectors
of transport, or prevent the escape, of exotic species during intention-
al introductions. The common law of public nuisance could be the
heart of such a system. Although one federal statute discussed earlier
has listed guidelines for avoiding unintentional introductions, with
corollary penalties,"° tort liability would be more effective in
97. Not all intentional introductions allowed by the Lacey Act will threaten the public
interest sufficiently to outweigh the-value of the conduct. For instance, where the intentional
introduction is performed with significant scientific basis for a proper public purpose, its value
may outweigh its negative effects, and therefore .no unreasonable interference is created.
Moreover, the value of the conduct may be substantially increased where the action furthers a
significant public purpose with reasonable scientific certainty, such as the application of exotic
biological pesticides to control the gypsy moth. LeAnn Spencer, State Deploys Bacteria in War
Against Gypsy Moth, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 1993, § 2, at 2. (noting that damage from exotic
bacteria minimized by deploying bacteria before native butterfly season begins).
98. Gina Lobaco, City Hall Fights Big 0&" A Refinery Defends Itself Against a Public
Nuisance Suit, CAL. LAWYER, May 1990, at 26.
99. Id.
100. See NANPCA, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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preventing unintentional introductions of exotic species for several
reasons.
First, a liability scheme would encourage transporters themselves
to use their individual expertise to develop methods which are the
most cost effective in preventing unintentional introductions. This
would replace the existing system whereby transporters rely on the
government to impose command and control regulations. A liability
scheme is advantageous because no single blanket regulation can be
ideal for every business. Congress has neither the time nor the
expertise to fashion appropriate regulations for all transporting
businesses.'' Therefore, a liability scheme should allow all trans-
porters to use their own expertise to tailor the best preventative
measures for their operations.
Second, a liability scheme would provide flexibility for a business
to change methods if a more effective procedure becomes available.
In contrast, federal regulations command a course of conduct which
remains unchanged until the law is reformed. A liability scheme will
produce changes much more quickly than the government bureaucra-
cy. Therefore, the rigidity of the command and control statutes would
be overcome with a liability scheme.'" The legislative process and
enactment of successive regulations merely prolongs the inadequacy
of existing preventative mechanisms.
Third, by encouraging innovative solutions to the emerging exotic
invasion, a wealth of new information will be discovered regarding
effective methods to cope with exotics. This knowledge can be shared
and improved upon by companies that have an incentive to avoid
environmental liability.0 3 Therefore, "[t]he effect of ... liability-
based statutes is to assign much of the responsibility for planning for
a dangerous and uncertain environmental future to that segment of
society most capable of finding innovative solutions: the private
sector."'"3° Unlike businesses, which strive to minimize costs, the
government is too cumbersome and lacks the incentives to devise
novel, preventative measures. Furthermore, expecting businesses to
protect themselves from becoming vectors of transport is not
101. Adam Babich, Understanding the New Era in Environmental-Law, 41 S.C. L. REv. 733,
742-46 (1990) (discussing difficulties in determining "acceptable risk" levels as described in
regulations).
102. Id. at 761-62 (discussing inability of government to keep up with risks involved in new
industry developments so that proper regulations can be devised).
103. Id. at 755-58.
104. Id. at 735.
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unreasonable since science enables us to discovter how exotics are
transported, their effect within ecosystems, and the inventory of native
species in different ecosystems.
A liability scheme for private suits should be premised on strict
liability, rather than the fault-based liability in which private citizens
pursue abatement injunctions. Strict liability is employed in nuisance
suits by official public representatives. 5 Strict liability would
augment the incentives for transporters to avoid causing destructive
exotic introductions by raising the standard of conduct required to
avoid liability. In effect, strict liability demands whatever is necessary
to prevent exotic invasion.
Sometimes the degree of care necessary to avoid causing an
interference with the public's ec6systems may be too costly, or even
impossible, to achieve. However, court enforcement of public
nuisance law provides the necessary flexibility to adequately respond
to these problems by balancing at two levels: first, when finding
public nuisance liability, and second, when fashioning an equitable
remedy like an injunction.'16 The court balances the utility of the
conduct with the gravity of the threat or harm to determine whether
there is an unreasonable interference which establishes liability. Next,
if liability exists, and if the legislature has not designated the
appropriate remedy, the court will balance the equities to determine
the proper scope of the injunction."° Therefore, public nuisance
law and the equitable discretion that accompanies it provides a
doctrine which is adaptable to varying circumstances.
This adaptability of public nuisance law to many types of
situations enables the law to be much less rigid than statutory
regulations. Unlike public nuisance law regulatory statutes are limited
in their ability to adjust to changed conditions. Change occurs
through either amendments pursuant to the legislative process or, less
radically, through, agency or judicial interpretations. Therefore,
common law public nuisance law provides the desired remedy of
abatement, without the quagmire of legislation or the obsolescence of
105. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
106. WiLLLAm H. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § i.6 (1977).
107. In State v. Davidson Industries, Inc., 635 P.2d 630,637 (Or. 1981), defendant was found
liable for a public nuisance for dumping fill into state waters without a permit. The court held
that, where the legislature does not clearly restrict the duty of a court of equity, "the usual rules
of equity would apply and... the court [would have] the power to balance the equities." Id.
Consequently, the court ordered that defendants employ a more cost-effective remedy than the
removal of all fill. Id. at 638.
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static regulations. Public nuisance may serve as either a supplement
to statutory regulations for intentional introductions or as the primary
tool for unintentional introductions of exotic species, perhaps the
most formidable environmental pollutant not adequately addressed in
the law to date.
A. Environmental Protection Through Nuisance Law
Because it is adaptable to unusual situations and encompasses
actions which have effects on the public at large, nuisance law is
-particularly useful in resolving environmental problems. As one
commentator wrote,
[t]he deepest doctrinal roots of modem environmental law are
found in the principles of nuisance . ... Nuisance actions have
challenged virtually every major industrial and municipal activity
which is today the. subject of comprehensive environmental
regulation .... Nuisance theory and case law is the common law
backbone of modem environmental and energy law.ls
However, the development of complex environmental statutes
evidences an apparent, or at least perceived, inadequacy of the
common law to cope with emerging environmental problems."°
While nuisance law may not be superior to environmental law
under all circumstances, nuisance law is more flexible. This flexibility
can plug any holes a statute leaves open When confronting the
ecosystem damage caused by exotic species. Recognizing this,
Congress has occasionally codified within statutes the principles of
public nuisance law.'
Public nuisance law may be employed when pollution unreason-
ably interferes with the environment. For example, in Georgia v.
108. RODGERS, supra note 106, at 100. Moreover, nuisance law is not static, but rather
conforms and adapts to an array of public and private interferences. As suggested by Dean
Prosser, "[Nuisance law] has meant all things to all people, and has been applied indiscriminately
to everything from an alarming advertisement to a-cockroach baked in a pie." W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86 (5th ed. 1984) (citations
omitted).
109. As stated by Percival and Miller, the conmon law "has proved to be a crude mechanism
at best for controlling the onslaught of modem-day pollution." ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 102 (1992). Professor Michael Blumm wrote that nuisance law
provides "an inadequate basis upon which to premise a comprehensive scheme of environmental
protection." MICHAEL C. BLUMM, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xii (1992).
110. See ag., The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, § 2(d)(1), 62
Stat. 1155, 1156 (1948) ("The pollution of interstate waters ... which endangers the health or
welfare of persons in a State other than that in which the discharge originates, is hereby declared
to be a public nuisance and subject to abatement as herein provided.").
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Tennessee Copper Co.,"' the State of Georgia successfully sued ore-
smelting companies that emitted sulfur gases which destroyed
vegetation. On the initial consideration,"' the United States
Supreme Court stated that
it is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of the sovereign that
the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by
sulphurous acid gas, that the forests bn its mountains, be they
better or worse, arid whatever domestic destruction they have
suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act
of persons beyond its control .... "I
Public nuisance suits can also be used to remedy past polluting
conduct that continues to unreasonably affect the'public at, large. For
instance, the California Court of Appeals recently allowed a public
nuisance suit to be brought by a present property owner against the
former owners, two oil companies that had operated a natural gas
processing plant onthe property and allegedly contaminated the land
between 1950 and 1970."' Because "the pollutants continue to
move through the soil and into the ground water causing new damage
each day,""' the court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of
action based on public nuisance."6
B. The Elements of a Public Nuisance
An actionable public nuisance is created by an unreasonable and
substantial nontrespassory interference with a public right,"7 which
-traditionally includes public health, safety, comfort, or conve-
nience." Under common law, the reasonableness of an interfer-
111. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474, 475 (1915) (hereinafter Tennessee
Copper II).
112. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (hereinafter Tennessee Copper
1) (initially finding liability). But see Tennessee Copper II, 2371U.S. at 474 (ordering defendant
to conform to certain conditions in final decree).
113. Tennessee Copper 1, 206 U.S. at 238.
114. Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 379 (Cal. App.
1993).
115. Id. at 380.
116. Id. at 381-83, 388 (noting defendants may also be liable for nuisance per se as three
California statutes prohibited water pollution through treatment or discharge of waste).
117. The Restatement uses "public right" and "public interest" interchangeably. See e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmts. a, b (1977).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1977); see also Village of Wilsonville v.
SCA Services, Inc. 426 N.E.2d 824 (Ill. 1981) ("If the nuisance affects a place where the public
has a legal right to go, and where the members frequently congregate, or where they are likely
to come within its influence, it is a public nuisance.").
[Vol. 5:21
1995] COMBATTING THE EXOTIC SPECIES INVASION 41
ence is determined according to relative concepts like "gravity of
harm" and "utility" of conduct which change between places and over
time. In contrast to a public nuisance, "a private nuisance is one' that
affects a single individual or a definite number of persons in the
enjoyment of some private right which is not common to the
public."" 9 However, public and private nuisances are not mutually
exclusive and may occur simultaneously.'
Historically, only public officials were allowed to bring a public
nuisance suit because public nuisances were criminal matters.'
Nevertheless, current law permits an individual to maintain a public
nuisance action if he or she can show "special injury, different in kind
from that suffered by the general public."'" This concept has also
been, referred to as "standing."'" Absent a special injury, only
public representatives may maintain a public nuisance suit. 24
Public nuisances define the effect of an activity rather than the
activity itself." As stated by the Supreme Court of Connecticut,
"the term nuisance refers to the condition that exists and not the act
that creates it."' 6 If the condition created by the action unreason-
ably and substantially interferes with a public right, the condition is
a public nuisance.
119. City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 75 P.2d 30, 34 (Ariz. 1938).
120. See, e.g., Ozark Poultry Products v. Garman, 472 S.W.2d 714 (Ark. 1971) (permitting
landowners' suit for public and private nuisance against. factory that polluted air and water
because activity invaded both public and private interests).
. 121. Armory Park v. Episcopal Comm. Serv., 712 P.2d 914, 918 (Ariz. 1985); see generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. a (1977) (describing early public nuisance suits
brought by private parties).
122. Leo v. General Elec. Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1989); see also Frady v. Portland
General Elec. Co., 637 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Or. App. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821C(1) (1977).
123. See Westwood Pharmaeceuticals v. Natural Fuel Gas Dist., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1281
(.D.N.Y. 1990) (interpreting New York nuisance law); Armory Park, 712 P.2d at 918; Akau
v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1133-34 (Haw. 1982).
124. See, e.g., Frady, 637 P.2d at 1348 ("An action against the perpetrator of a public
nuisance can be brought only by the state, unless an individual can show special injury, different
in kind from that suffered by the general public.").
125. See Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1247 (R.I. 1982) ("The essential element of an
actionable nuisance is that persons have suffered Harm or are threatened with injuries they ought
not have to bear ... liability in nuisance is predicated upon unreasonable injury rather than
upon unreasonable conduct.").
126. Quinnett v. Newman, 568 A.2d 786, 789 (Conn. 1990). See infra notes 167-172 and
accompanying text.
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1. Reasonableness Test Allows Flexibility. Unreasonable
interference with a public right is an elastic concept which changes
over time."z  The balancing test suggested by the Restatement
permits consideration of changing values, by stating that an unreason-
able invasion exists if "the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility
of the actor's conduct .... ,,'s As society's values shift, such as
from promoting a strong national defense to environmental cleanli-
ness, formerly accepted practices which damage goals important to
present-day society will-more likely become prohibited as public
nuisances. 29  Therefore, public nuisance law is capable of adapting
and progressing with evolving societal values, rather than fading into
obsolescence.
2. The Standard of Fault Under Nuisance Law. Though
damage to a public resource may clearly evidence the prima facie case
for a public nuisance, there is considerable confusion regarding the
importance of the fault of the actor in assigning liability. In contrast
to private niuisances, as discussed below, fault is not a prerequisite of
liability for a public nuisance action brought by the sovereign. Where
a public nuisance is found and the plaintiff is the sovereign, or an
official representative of the public, the court never considers the fault
of the actor, but rather invokes strict liability.for damage caused. 3 '
This view follows from the origin of public nuisances, which treated
nuisances as crimes at common law that were controllable by the
127. See State v. Quality Egg Farm, Inc., 311 N.W.2d 650, 655 (Wis. 1981) ("What may be
a nuisance in one location may not be one elsewhere ... those which in their nature are not
nuisances [] may become so by reason of the locality, surroundings or the manner in which they
may be conducted or managed.').
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1977). This rule was formulated
specifically for private nuisances. However, the drafters explain that "a similar rule may, and
commonly does, apply to conduct that results in a public nuisance." Id. at cmt. a.
The Restatement provides the following factors to determine if the gravity of the
interference with the public right outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct: (1) the extent and
character of the interference, (2) the social value that the law. attaches to it, (3) the character
of the locality involved, and (4) the burden placed of the members of the public. Id. at § 827.
129. See Armory Park, 712 P.2d at 921 ("What might amount to a serious nuisance in one
locality by reason of the density of the population, or character of the neighborhood affected,
may in-another place and under different surroundings be deemed proper and unobjectionable.
what amounts [to] ... a nuisance ... cannot be precisely defined.") (quoting Macdonald v.
Perry, 255 P. 494, 497 (Ariz. 1927)).
130. See Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood.Law of Public Nuisance,
54 ALBANY L. REV. 359,368-73 (1990); Louise A. Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plaintiffs,
16 ENvTL. L. REP. 10292, 10294-10296 (1986).
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state's police power to protect the public.' Though public nuisanc-
es are no longer limited to crimes, they continue to be treated as
unreasonable violations of the public welfare.12  As such, they are
abated in favor of the sovereign's police power regardless of the
degree of care exercised by the actor. Rather than focusing on
the mental state of the actor, courts focus on the effects of the
conduct and employ strict liability when the sovereign exercises its
police power to control public interferences found to be unreason-
able.' 34
Though strict liability may seem harsh, it is imposed only where
there are serious interferences with a public interest. 35  Strict
liability works well by providing a powerful incentive for property
owners to be aware of conditions emanating from their property
which interfere with the public. Critics argue that this liability cannot
conform future conduct of a landowner who acts with all due care but
is still unaware of the condition causing the nuisance. The response
is that due care is not necessarily a high standard and strict liability
encourages owners of property to exercise more than mere due care
to discover and remedy conditions which could impose serious
consequences upon the public. The following cases illustrate the
absolute nature of strict liability.
131. v. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 90 (5th ed. 1984).
132. Abrams & Washington, supra note 130, at 366.
133. Starrv. Commissioner of Envtl. Protection, 627 A.2d 1296,1315 (Conn. 1993) ("Because
a public nuisance implicates the rights of the public and the exercise of the state's police power,
the legislature could legitimately determine that the plaintiff's lack of culpability for the
existence of the contaminated condition is outweighed by the state's interest in protecting public
resources.").
134. See, eg., National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 414 A.2d
37 (Pa. 1980) ("The notion of fault is least functional, however, when balancing the interests of
a property holder against the interests of a state in the exercise of its police power, because the
beneficiary is not an individual but the community.").
Unlike public nuisances, private nuisances require fault; thus, an actor is liable only if the
nuisance arose out of his negligent, abnormally dangerous, or intentional act. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822. See, e.g., Hall v. Phillips, 436 N.W.2d 139, 145 (1989), where the
court noted that "one may be subject to liability for tortious private nuisance... if the invasion
is intentional and unreasonable or otherwise actionable under rules controlling liability for
negligence or liability for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities." Id. at 145. Though
plaintiff did not allege negligence or abnormally dangerous conduct, the court reversed a
summary judgment to determine whether defendant's application of herbicide which blew onto
plaintiff's bean crop was an intentional invasion. Ma at 140-142, 146.
135. See, eg., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915) (air pollution); Frady
v. Portland Elec. Co., 637 P.2d 1345 (Or. App. 1981) (noise pollution); Lansco, Inc. v.
Department of Envtl. Protection, 350 A.2d 520 (NJ.Super.Ct.Ch.Div. 1974) (water pollution).
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In New York v. Shore Realty,116 the court noted that the
defendant, as a landowner, "is subject to liability for either a public
or private nuisance on its property upon learning of the nuisance and
having a reasonable opportunity to abate it.""7  However, in
addition, the court wrote that the threat of a hazardous waste spill
from deteriorating tanks maintained on defendant's land constituted
a "public nuisance" for which defendant was liable "irrespective of
negligence or fault."'38 The court's analysis suggests that Shore was
liable in two respects: first, Shore was negligently liable for a public
and private nuisance because it knew that hazardous waste had been
disposed on the property and failed to remedy the problem; second,
regardless of Shore's knowledge or fault, it was strictly liable for
public nuisances which emanated from the use of its propeity.1"9
Likewise, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Barnes & Tucker Co."4 held the defendant liable for a public
nuisance when his water-filled mine discharged acidified water into a
stream. The court explained that "the absence of facts supporting
concepts of negligence, foreseeability or unlawful conduct, is not in
the least fatal to a finding of the existence of a common law public
nuisance.' 141  The court emphasized that concern with defendant's
fault is misplaced in public nuisance law because the proper inquiry
focuses on the result of defendant's act, not the action itself. 14
Finally, in State v. Hatfield, 4' the Supreme Court of Nebraska
enjoined the operation of the defendant's restaurant because it
136. New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
137. Id. at 1050.
•138. Id. at 1051.
139. I& at 1050-51. Although the court muddles the distinction between public and private
nuisance, its ultimate decision was correct. If a landowner is aware of a condition on his land
which is causing a nuisance but fails to remedy the situation, the landowner acts negligently and
is liable for either private nuisance, public nuisance, or both depending on the interests invaded.
However, if a landowner is without fault and unaware of a condition on his land which causes
substantial interference with a public interest, the landowner cannot avoid liability by remaining
ignorant. Thus, he is strictly liable for abating the p.ublic nuisance. See Halper, supra note 130,
at 10295 ("that which interferes with the rights of all must be abated when the public, through
its appropriate representative, seeks its abatement.").
140. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871 (Pa. 1974).
141. Id. at 883.
142. Id; see also Tipler v. McKenzie Tank Lines, 547 So. 2d 438, 440 (Ala. 1989)
("[Nuisance] may consist of activities that are conducted in an otherwise lawful and careful
manner, as well as conduct that combines with the culpable act of another, so long as it works
hurt, inconvenience, or damage to the complaining party").
143. State v. Hatfield, 158 N.W.2d 612 (Neb. 1968).
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attracted "hoodlums, prostitutes, gamblers, and other disorderly
persons and [was] a constant source of trouble for the police."1"
Even though the defendant "attempted to. maintain order in his
establishment and ha[d] cooperated with the police," the court held
that the restaurant constituted a public nuisance.45 Therefore,
regardless of defendant's remedial efforts and lack of culpability, he
was held strictly liable because his business caused an unreasonable
interference with the public welfare which had to be abated.
As illustrated above, when the sovereign exercises its police
power to safeguard the public interest from interferences which are
deemed unreasonable by a legislature or court, the person who owns
the property causing the interference is strictly liable. Consequently,
the sovereign may protect public resources from degradation caused
by pollution emanating from a person's property, regardless of the
culpability of the owner.
C. Private Citizens as Plaintiffs for Public Nuisance Claims
Nuisance suits by private citizens are distinguishable from suits
by the sovereign in two critical ways. First, to maintain a public
nuisance suit, a private citizen must demonstrate that he or she suffers
a "special injury"-one that is "different in kind from that suffered as
a member of the public."' 46  Second, the citizen plaintiff has a
greater burden in establishing defendant's liability than does the
sovereign plaintiff
1. Special Injury 'Requirement. Frady v. Portland General
Electric Co.47 illustrates the special injury necessary for private
citizens to support a public nuisance action. Landowners sued a
nearby turbine facility alleging that their property suffered physical
damage caused by low frequency sound waves emitted from the
plant."48 Defendants claimed that plaintiffs merely alleged facts
constituting a claim for a public nuisance (a public right to be free
from excessive noise), but failed to allege a special injury necessary
to maintain the suit.'49 The court upheld plaintiffs' complaints and
144. Id. at 613.
145. Id. at 613-14.
146. Frady v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 637 P.2d 1345, 1348-49 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1348-49.
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stated, "[w]hen a public nuisance interferes with an individual's right
to use and enjoy his real property, the individual suffers special injury
and may bring an action against the perpetrator of the nuisance." '
Similarly, in Leo v. General Electric Co.,"' commercial fisher-
men were permitted to bring a public ,nuisance action against a
polluter of the Hudson River. "[D]iminution or loss of livelihood is
not suffered by every person who fishes in the Hudson River. ....
[However,] commercial fishermen do have standing to complain of the
pollution of the waters from which they derive their living.""15
Therefore, private plaintiffs must suffer a personal or physical
invasion, such as personal injury, injury to property, or other damage
different from and in addition to the damage to the general public.
This invasion must also be in connection with the invasion of a public
interest (clean rivers, clean air, freedom from excessive noise).,5
When these requirements are met, private plaintiffs may maintain a
public nuisance suit.
However, the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Akau v. Olohana,
1
'
presented a different position which may evidence a trend away from
the special injury rule, towards a more liberal "injury in fact"
standard. Under this court's standard, an individual may sue to
enforce public rights without showing an injury different in kind from
the public's injury, provided that (1) plaintiff suffered an injury in fact
and (2) a multiplicity of other similar suits would be avoided if the
suit were allowed to continue.155 In Akau, plaintiffs sued defendants
for barring beach access to the public along a two and a half mile
stretch of property. Plaintiffs alleged that a trail leading to the beach
150. 1& at 1349.
151. Leo v. General Elec. Co., 538 N.Y.2d 844 (App. Div. 1989).
152. Id. at 847; see also Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250-51 (D. Me. 1973)
(allowing commercial fisherman to maintain action for public nuisance when oil tanker polluted
coastal waters, but rejecting businessmen's claims for lost customers because of polluted
beaches), affd, 559 F.2d 1200 (1st Cir. 1977).
153. For one example, see Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3rd. Cir.
1985). The plaintiff brought a public nuisance suit for clean-up damages and injunctive relief
against a tenant who polluted property and contaminated a river. Id. at 306-307. The court held
that the plaintiff could not maintain a public nuisance action because, although its pecuniary
harm was different in kind to the public's harm, the plaintiff did not suffer this harm from the
interference of a public right, namely the right to pure water. The condition on the plaintiff's
property was the cause of the harm, not the result of it. The plaintiff suffered harm in the
exercise of a wholly private right. Id. at 316.
154. Akan v. Olohana, 652 P.2d 1130 (Haw. 1982).
155. Id. at 1134 (noting that avoidance of multiplicity of suits would likely entail a class
action).
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was a public right of way.56 The court held that obstruction of a
right of way is a public nuisance.'57 Moreover, the court determined
that plaintiffs had standing to assert the public nuisance action
because they suffered injury to their recreational interest in using and
enjoying the beach. 8 Therefore, the interference with a non-
economic interest was sufficient to enable plaintiffs to fulfill the less
strict "injury in fact" standard. 9 Despite this trend, most courts
adhere to the "different in kind" standard."6 However, in order to
allow citizens to pursue public nuisance suits where a public nuisance
occurs solely within the public domain, the more appropriate standard
to apply is the "injury in fact" threshold. 6'
2. Greater Burden of Establishing Liability. Private plaintiffs
who assert public nuisance claims have more difficulty than sovereign
plaintiffs in establishing liability because they do not act pursuant to
the police power of the state.6 2 As a result, the fault-based require-
ments found in private nuisance suits also apply to public nuisance
suits brought by private individuals."6 Without this rule, a plaintiff
could shift the burden of proof and evade limits on recovery by
artfully pleading a public nuisance, thus causing strict liability to
attach. For instance, a plaintiff could receive damages for a tort
which would otherwise be barred by his or her own contributory
negligence by alleging a public nuisance instead of a private nui-
sance." To avoid this problem, private plaintiffs are required to
156. Id. at 1132.
157. Id at 1133.
158. Id. at 1133-35 ("This court has been in step with the trend away from the special injury
rule towards the view that a plaintiff, if injured, has standing .... We concur in-this trend
because we believe it is unjust to deny members of the public the ability to enforce the public's
rights when they are injured.").
159. Id. at 1135.
160. See, e.g., Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 721 n.11 (Mich. 1992)
(denying public nuisance suit for contamination of groundwater because defendant did not
contaminate plaintiff's property); Saks v. Petosa, 584 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 1992) (affirming
dismissal of public nuisance action where erection of a fence in violation of zoning ordinances
did not cause petitioners special injury).
161. For further discussion regarding the appropriate standard to apply to citizens suing for
the public nuisance of ecosystem damage caused by exotics, see infra notes 204-210 and
accompanying text.
162. Halper, supra note 130, at 10297-98.
163. Halper, supra note 130, at 10298.
164. See McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 160 N.E. 391, 391-92 (N.Y. 1928) (allowing
contributory negligence defense when plaintiff tripped on raised edge of sidewalk, regardless of
whether plaintiff claimed negligence or public nuisance as the "substance of the wrong is
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establish liability according to the fault-based scheme applicable to
private nuisances, regardless of whether they assert public or private
nuisance claims. 6
The Connecticut Supreme Court has decided cases which
exemplify the different treatment of public nuisance suits brought by
private individuals."6  In Quinnett v. Newman,167 the plaintiff and
defendant were both private citizens. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant, a liquor store owner, created a public nuisance by selling
liquor to an intoxicated person who was operating a motor vehi-
cle." . The court rejected the plaintiff's public nuisance claim
against the liquor vendor on the grounds that the hazardous condition
of an intoxicated person operating a car results from the motorist's
use of alcohol, not the vendor's sale of the liquor.169 In so holding,
the court explained that both public and private nuisances refer to the
condition that exists, not the actions which created it. 7° In both
actions, the type of liability applied depends upon whether the
defendant acted intentionally or unintentionally.17 ' This means that
[i]f the creator of the condition intends the act that brings about
the condition found to be a nuisance, the nuisance ... is ...
absolute and its creator is strictly liable. ... If the condition
claimed to be a nuisance arises out of the creator's unintentional
but negligent act, .e, a failure to exercise due care, the resulting
condition is... a negligent nuisance.'12
Consequently, under private citizen public nuisance suits, an actor will
be strictly liable-for conditions caused by intentional acts but will only
be liable for unintentional accidents if a duty of care was breached.
Not all jurisdictions agree with applying a fault-based scheme to
public nuisance actions brought by private plaintiffs. For instance, in
negligence"); Abrams & Washington, supra note 130, at 388-89; Halper, supra note 130, at
10298.
165. The private nuisances being considered are those in which an actor is liable only if the
nuisance arose out of his negligent, abnormally dangerous, or intentional and unreasonable act.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977). As a result, the plaintiffs only incentive to
bring a public nuisance claim rather than a private nuisance suit is when plaintiff has suffered
an injury different in kind, arising out pf the exercise of a public right unconnected with the
ownership of his property. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
166. See eg., Starr v. Comm'r of Envtl, Protection, 627 A.2d 1296 (Conn. 1993).
167. Quinnett v. Newinan, 568 A.2d 786 (Conn. 1990).
168. 1d. at 786-87.
169. Id. at 789.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id
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Wood v. Picillo'73 multiple private plaintiffs sued under public
nuisance alleging that the defendants' chemical dump site was
polluting the soil of a marsh connected to a publicly owned river.' 4
The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were required to prove
negligence as an element of their nuisance case. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court stated, "this court has not required plaintiffs to
establish negligence in nuisance actions."'7" Furthermore, the court
distinguished nuisance from negligence liability on the grounds that
"liability in nuisance is predicated upon unreasonable injury rather
than upon unreasonable conduct."' 7 6 Since the defendants' chemical
dumping activities constituted a substantial threat to humans and
aquatic wildlife, the court held the defendants strictly liable for
creating both a public and private nuisance.77 Consequently, the
importance of the actor's fault differs among jurisdictions in private
actions for public nuisance.
Since rules regarding the culpability of defendants in public
nuisance suits differ depending on the jurisdiction and the character
of the plaintiff, it is not surprising that public nuisance law has
become muddled. Perhaps the best explanation is that nuisance law
developed separately in each state and varies according to the values
placed on certain activities. Nonetheless, in public nuisance suits by
the sovereign and by private citizens, strict liability becomes most
appropriate where a condition endangers a public resource like an
ecosystem and the remedy requested is an injunction. When the
private citizen seeks abatement and the court determines that the
condition emanating from a defendant's property is in fact an
unreasonable interference with a public right, then strict liability
should apply and abatement should be ordered. If a plaintiff seeks
abatement of a bona fide public nuisance as determined by the fact-
finder, the plaintiff who is not the sovereign should not be required
to overcome a higher burden of proof An argument against this
173. Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244 (R.I. 1982).
174. Ld. at 1245-47.
175. Id. at 1248.
176. Id. at 1247 (citing Braun v. Iannoti, 175 A. 656, 657 (R.I. 1934)). In Braun, the court
held defendant liable for a nuisance caused by smoke and soot emitted from his furnace which
invaded plaintiff's house, regardless of whether the smokestack was negligently constructed.
Braun, 175 A. at 657.
177. Wobd, 433 A.2d at 1249. However, the court explained that strict liability could also
rest upon use of land for abnormally dangerous activities without the presence of a nuisance or
negligence. Nevertheless, the court's finding of both public and private nuisance made it
"unnecessary to consider the doctrine of strict liability." Id. at n.7.
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approach is that private plaintiffs have selfish interests, which are
their primary motivation for bringing suit; thus, they do not appropri-
ately represent the public interest. Regardless of the plaintiff's
motivation, if the remedy sought is identical to the remedy a public
representative would request (i.e. abatement), the plaintiff's personal
interests do not conflict with the alleviation of an unreasonable public
interference. Therefore, where an interference is a public nuisance,
the public should not have to wait for the public representative to
bring suit when a private plaintiff with standing could accomplish the
same result more quickly178 Consequently, strict liability should
apply when public nuisance plaintiffs, private' or sovereign, request
abatement injunctions to prevent an unreasonable 7 9 interference
with substantial societal interests.
D. -Remedies
TWo remedies are available to an individual who can demonstrate
an injury different in kind but connected to the damage suffered by
the general public. First, such a plaintiff may recover damages for the
injury sustained, such as diminution in market value of property, as
well as for mental distress and annoyance caused by the nuisance.80
Second, the plaintiff may be granted an injunction against the
defendant to abate'the nuisance. 8' Therefore, individual plaintiffs
178. One commentator recognizes the "Catch-22" under the current majority rule for private
plaintiffs who seek to maintain public nuisance suits. See Miles Tolbert, The Public as Plaintiff.
Public Nuisance and Federal Citizens Suits in the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVrL. L.
REV. 511, 514-15 (1990) ("[B]y requiring that a plaintiff have injuries different in kind from the
general public, however, the law creates a private attorney general whose interests are, by
definition, divorced from those of the public whose rights he is to vindicate. ... Thus, the
common law as it has developed has trapped... all environmental groups seeking to vindicate
public rights, into a Catch-22: the law does not allow them to bring those lawsuits which they
are most competent to bring.").
179. See discussion supra text and accompanying notes 132-134.
180. Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 46 (Ct. App. 1993).
181. Armory Park v. Episcopal Community, Serv., 712 P.2d 914, 918 (Ariz. 1985). See also
Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 996-98 (1965). Historically,
Courts at-Law preferred to award damages rather than allow the Chancery Courts to fashion
equitable relief like injufictions. Id. at 997. Even today, after the merger of law and equity,
courts will usually not grant equitable remedies unless legal ones cannot redress the injury. Id.
at 998. Consequently, injunctions will be granted when damages are inadequate, such as with
ongoing nuisances where a multiplicity of suits or an award of future damages would be
required. Id. at 1001.
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can recover damages for personal injuries sustained and be granted
injunctions to halt the public nuisance." 2
Similar to the private plaintiff, a state suing for public nuisance
may recover damages for injury to state property and get an
injunction to abate the nuisance."s For instance, in Lansco Inc. v.
Department of Environmental Protection" the State of New Jersey
was allowed to recover damages for the harm to its water resources
caused by a 14,000 gallon oil spill.1 The court wrote, "[lt has long
been established that the sovereign's interest in the preservation of
public resources and the environment enable it to maintain an action
to prevent injury thereto ... [and to] obtain damages for injury to
public resources and the environment."1 6 Consequently, an action
by the state is the only means by which damages to public resources
can be recovered.
IV. PUBLIC NUISANCE LAW APPLIED To EXOTIC SPECIES
INTRODUCTION
Since exotic species often act as pollutants, their introduction into
foreign ecosystems can create public nuisances comparable to oil
spills, hazardous waste discharges, and other events causing damage
to public environmental resources. In many instances, exotic species
can cause more severe damage to public land and water ecosystems
than typical pollutants. Unlike a hazardous waste or oil spill which
182. Recall that the burden of proof usually differs between private plaintiffs and the
sovereign. See supra text accompanying note 146. However, I argue that where the private
plaintiff seeks damages for himself he should be subject to the normal fault based liability
scheme. But if plaintiff seeks an injunction which abates the unreasonable public interference,
strict liability should apply. See supra notes 173-179 and accompanying text.
183. See Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596,
604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("[w]here the governmental unit owns or has a property interest which
is injuriously affected by the nuisance, we perceive no reason why it should be barred from
recovering money damages for injury done to that interest"); City of New York v. Taliaferrow,
551 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (affirming award of compensatory damages, punitive
damages, civil penalty and injunction in favor of city where defendant operated property for
prostitution). But see Los Angeles v. Shpegel-Dimsey, Inc., 244 Cal.Rptr. 507,510-11 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988) (denying city recovery for costs to abate fire caused by defendant, even though fire
constituted public nuisance, because costs of public services are borne by public as a whole).
184. Lansco, Inc. v. Depaitment of Envtl. Protection, 350 A.2d 520 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1975).
185. Id. at 524 (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1970)).
186. Id. at 524 (noting that state may have fiduciary obligation to protect environment and
seek compensation for "any diminution in that trust corpus.") (quoting State v. Jersey Central,
308 A.2d 671, 674 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973)).
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involves a finite amount of pollution, exotic species can reproduce and
multiply within an ecosystem. Their proliferation thus tears the
tenuous threads of the food web through predation, competition for
food and space, and habitat modification. Furthermore, the longer
exotic species are allowed to establish themselves within an ecosys-.
tem, the harder it is to eradicate them later. As a result, exotic
species are potentially more dangerous to ecosystems than any other
human pollutant. Responsible parties should pay for the resulting
environmental damage just as they would for other pollution
discharges which contaminate public resources. From 1906 to 1991,
seventy-nine exotic species introduced into the United States caused
$97 billion in economic damage and incalculable amounts of non-
economic damage.187
Nevertheless, before public nuisance law can be applied to the
hazards of exotic species, the following questions must be answered:
1) Is there a public right involved?
2) Is the interference with that right unreasonable?
a) What is the gravity of harm to the public interest?
b) What is the utility of the conduct lost if liability is found?
3) Has plaintiff suffered a harm different in kind, but connected
to the interference suffered by the public generally?
4) Does plaintiff seek damages, an injunction, or both?
The answers to these questions may limit the application of public
nuisance law. Moreover, it must be determined whether the nuisance
was actually and proximately caused by exotics emanating from
property used by defendant.188
A. Public Right
Traditionally, land and water used and owned by the public have
been encompassed by the public right to be free from pollution.189
Prior to 1992, however, no appellate court had reviewed the assertion
that exotic-free ecosystems and biodiversity are public rights
encompassed by public nuisance law. In Colorado Division of
Wildlife v. Cox,"9 the Colorado Court of Appeals was presented
187. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT REPORT BRIEF, 139 CONG. REc. H8476 (1993).
188. Discussed infra text accompanying notes 211-223.
189. See Tennessee Copper I, 206 U.S. at 230 (regarding state's interest in its forests); see also
Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 350 A.2d 520 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975),
and text accompanying notes 184-186 (discussing state's interest in its "public xesources and the
environment").
190. Colorado Div. of Wildlife v. Cox, 843 P.2d 662 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
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with a public nuisance suit brought by three state agencies against
owners of an exotic wildlife ranch.'9' These agencies included the
Division of Wildlife, Department of Natural Resources, and the
Colorado Wildlife Commission.'" The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants' possession of unpermitted, non-native animals, such as red
deer, Barbary sheep, and ibex goats, was a public nuisance as defined
by a Colorado statute. 93 The pertinent part of the statute reads:
Domesticated or exotic wildlife which are illegally possessed or
have escaped the owner's control and which are determined by the
division to be detrimental to native wildlife, habitat or other wildlife
resources by the threat of predation, the spread of disease, habitat
competition, interbreeding with native wildlife, or other significant
damage... [shall be considered] to be a public nuisance .*.. [and
defendants are liable] for damages to the state's wildlife resources
under appropriate statutory and common law.. .
-The plaintiffs sought an injunction allowing.them to remove the public
nuisance at the defendants' expense. 95 The defendants contended
that their.animals were not shown to be a public nuisance. However,
the court responded, "[scientific evidence] on the impacts caused by
red deer, Barbary sheep, and ibex goats, was more than sufficient to
support the trial court's determination ... that defendants' animals
were 'detrimental to Colorado native wildlife." ' 196 The abatement
orders were subsequently upheld.
Colorado Division of Wildlife illustrates the emerging social
attitudes and values regarding the quality of ecosystems. This case
presents strong evidence that ecosystems free from destructive exotic
organisms are within the public interest and deserve protection by the
common law of public nuisance. Following from this, the mainte-
nance of the health and quality of ecosystems and biodiversity within
the public domain should also be acknowledged by courts as a public
right. In particular, interference with the well-being of ecosystems
and destruction of biodiversity within public lands should be dealt
with under public nuisance law.
191. Id. at 663.
192. ld.
193. Id.
194. See Id. at 663 (quoting Colorado Dep't of Nat. Resources Regulation 1107b, 2 COLO.
CODE REGS. §§ 406-408 (1990)) (second emphasis added).
195. Id. at 663.
196. I& at 664. "
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B. Unreasonable Interference
I Assuming that destructive activities of exotic species interfere
with a public right, the next determination is whether the interference
is unreasonable. To ascertain the viability of using public nuisance as
a control mechanism for unintentional introductions, it must first be
determined whether the judicial public nuisance balance would weigh
in favor of prohibiting unintentional introductions.1" If the nui-
sance is statutorily defined, as in Colorado, the legislature will have
already tipped the scales in favor of public nuisance labelling.98 If
the nuisance is not defined by statute, courts will then balance the
gravity of harm to the public interest against the value of the conduct
sought to be prohibited. f the harm to the public outweighs the
value of the conduct, the conduct is deemed to be a public nui-
sance.19
1. Gravity of Harm. The threat to the public interest caused
by exotic species is evident. For example, in Hawaii nearly forty
percent of all native bird species have become extinct, largely as a
result of human introduction of exotics.' Likewise, numerous
transporting activities have introduced an unknown quantity and
variety of exotics into water and terrestrial ecosystems.21  The
proliferation of exotics within ecosystems may even trigger the
collapse of entire biotic communities into -monocultures.' There-
fore, introductions of exotics are jeopardizing the public's interest in
maintaining biodiversity and the health of ecosystems.
2. Value of Conduct Impaired. Stow-away exotic species which
are transported by importing activities (via ballast water or hidden
197. See supra note 128 (listing four factors to determine reasonableness of interference).
198. See e.g., Colorado Div. of Wildlife v. Cox, supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text;
Starr v. Commissioner of Envtl. Protection, 627 A.2d 1296, 1315 (Conn. 1993) (state statute
prohibited "maintaining" a source of pollution that constituted a public nuisance, regardless of
fault or affirmative action).
199. Supra note 129 and accompanying text.
200. Dolan, supra n.32, at 316.
201. For example, zebra mussels have been found in the ballast water of ships, insects in
crates of fruit, and snakes within the wheel wells of airplanes. Supra notes 14, 35, and 36, and
accompanying text.
202. Supra note 3 and accompanying text. This threat is particularly problematic because
it is not quantifiable, unlike present damage. Thus, while aware of its existence, we tend to
ignore it.
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among cargo) are troublesome because their introduction is uninten-
tional. Furthermore, the importing activity which could be lost or
impaired due to public nuisance liability is highly valued because it
serves our human culture and way of life. Therefore, the harm/value
balance may be nearly equal. It for the sake of human conveniences,
our ecosystems collapse, the resulting desire to protect biodiversity
will come too late.
Depending on the severity of the existing or threatening
interference, the potential for ecosystem damage or collapse may be
great enough to outweigh the value of unprotected importing
activity that has a low economic cost. It is important to note that
public nuisance liability will not prohibit all importing activity.
Instead, it will merely alter the behavior of importers so that they
choose the course of action which allows them to avoid liability.
Furthermore, potential liability will effectively prohibit activity which
demonstrates a significant threat of -introduction because the
defendant risks being charged with the cost of abating the public
nuisance. In some cases, the defendant may also be required to pay
for damages sustained by public resources. Since society is increasing-
ly valuing its ecosystems and biodiversity, the individual cost to guard
against unintentional introduction of exotic species will likely be
outweighed by the public's interest.
C. Plaintiffs Special Injury
Even if a defendant's conduct produces an unreasonable
interference with a public right, individuals may not sue unless they
can show an injury different in kind but connected to the interference
suffered by the public. While the sovereign is not limited to showing
special injury in order to bring a public nuisance suit, these constraints
are imposed on citizens seeking the remedy of public nuisance as a
response to exotic introduction.2" This'presents a substantial legal
hurdle since m6st of the ecosystems affected are within the public
domain and unrelated to private ownership interests. For instance,
courts have refused to allow individuals to maintain suits under public
nuisance law where other forms of pollution did not affect them in
203. The term "unprotected importing" means transporting without precautions to prevent
the introductions of exotic species.
204. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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any manner different from the general public. 2 5 While some people
arguably are more concerned than others about the status of our
ecosystems and biodiversity, individuals seldom suffer distinct
recognizable injuries that can be distinguished from public suffering.
This is because exotics usually only affect the'public domain.
Consequently, individuals are unlikely to successfully institute a public
nuisance action for failure to show a special injury that is. different in
kind to their injury suffered as a member of the public. Some argue
that this is the correct result because public nuisance suits should
remain under exclusive authority of the sovereign rather than
individuals motivated by self-interest.2
However, this argument ignores the fact that individuals will not
taint the purposes of public nuisance suits because the court wil
determine whether the invasion constitutes a public injury, regardless
of the plaintiff's interest. Therefore, the individual plaintiff merely
acts as a public representative providing the impetus for a court to
examine the alleged public interference.
If a lower standard for maintaining public nuisance suits is
adopted, as seen in Akau v. Olohana,' perhaps public nuisance
suits would be within the quiver of remedies accessible to citizens.
Additionally, a federal or state statutory scheme, like that involved in
Colorado Division of Wildlife v. Cox,' could solve such deficiencies
by (1) declaring the introduction of exotics a public nuisance and (2)
providing a citizen suit provision similar to existing federal environ-
mental statutes, which allows injunctions to be imposed against
violators. 9 Furthermore, the statute could mandate strict liability,
like the legislation in Starr v. Commissioner of Environmental
205. See Rome City v. King, 450 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (denying property owners'
public nuisance action for noises and odors that interfered with their use and enjoyment of the
land because noises and odors were equally suffered by the public).
206. See, eg., Abrams & Washington, supra note 130, at 389.
207. Akau v. Olohana, 652 P.2d 1130 (Haw. 1982) (holding that standing to sue required
merely injury in fact rather than special injury distinct from public's loss).
208. Supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
209. See, eg., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
Section 1365 authorizes "any citizen" to sue to enforce the Act "against any person who is
alleged to be in violation" of the Act and to receive both an injunction against the violator and
civil penalties. Id at § 1365. Of course, the citizen bringing suit must establish the constitution-
al elements of standing: concrete and imminent "injury in fact," "causal connection" between
plaintiffs' alleged injury and defendant's conduct, and "likelihood" that a favorable decision will
redress plaintiffs' injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). Notice
that the federal standing threshold is equivalent to the requirement set by the Supreme Court
of Hawaii in Akau, 652 P.2d at 113 4-35.
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Protection,21 so that the fault-based common law approach routinely
applied in private citizen suits would be preempted. Provided the
requirements of causation are established, a state statutory scheme
incorporating public nuisance law principles would provide protection
to native resources and facilitate citizens' access to that protection.
D. Causation
There is perhaps no greater obstacle for plaintiffs in a public
nuisance suit alleging exotic species damage than linking a defendant
with the nuisance. The subject of causation is too large and complex
to be treated in its entirety here. However, this Article briefly
discusses some of the general principles in an effort to highlight the
sizeable hurdle of actual and legal (proximate) causation, particularly
in the area of exotic damage.
In addition to the elements of nuisance a plaintiff must show that
defendant "caused" the unreasonable condition. In Armory Park v.
Episcopal Community Services,211 th& court held that a charity
center caused a public nuisance to the surrounding community by
attracting transients who invaded the plaintiff's property when
travelling to the center.21 The court explained that the charity
center's offer to provide free meals "set in motion" the forces
resulting in the injuries to the residents.213 Therefore, "[l]iability
will arise for public nuisance when one person's acts set in motion a
force or chain of events resulting in the invasion., 214 Interestingly,
the Arizona Supreme Court did not discuss whether the events were
foreseeable to the defendant, but instead limited its causation inquiry
to damages actually caused.215
Courts differ with respect to whether liability in a public nuisance
case is limited to only the foreseeable consequences of the defendant's
actions. For instance, the court in Quinnett explained that a public
nuisance "describes an inherently dangerous condition that has a
natural tendency to inflict injury upon persons and property., 216 In
Quinnett, a vendor selling liquor to a person operating a motor
210. Starr v. Commissioner of Envtl. Protection, 627 A.2d 1296, 1315 (Conn. 1993).
211. Armory Park v. Episcopal Comm. Serv., 712 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1985).
212. Id at 920.
213. Id.
214. d. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 824 cmt. b).
215. Id.
216. Quinnett v. Newman, 568 A.2d 786,788-89 (Conn. 1990).
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vehicle did not proximately cause the public nuisance, of a drunken
motorist; thus, defendant was not liable.217 In contrast, the court in
Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., a case involving the
application of strict liability, stated that "the absence of facts
supporting concepts of negligence, foreseeability or unlawful conduct
is not the least fatal to a finding of the existence of a common law
public nuisance. ' '218  Therefore, where courts apply strict liability,
apparently a plaintiff need only show something less than proximate
causation. According to one commentator, "[t]he appropriate
causation analysis to be applied to public nuisance ... is not the
traditional tort test focussing on proximate cause, but rather one
which has at its core an inquiry into defendant's use of the land., 219
However, where the court requires culpability on the part of the
defendant, the nuisance must also be a proximate cause of defendant's
actions.m
Even if foreseeability of the injury is not required, the plaintiffs
still must show that the defendant was the actual cause of the exotic
infestation. This question of fact becomes a scientific burden because,
in most cases, there is a lag time between exposure of the exotic to
the ecosystem and the manifestation of an environmental prob-
lem." , Therefore, by the time an exotic infestation becomes
apparent, there may be no way to trace the introduction to an
identifiable defendant.
As science progresses, this burden may be lightened for two
reasons. First, ever-increasing scientific investigation will accumulate
knowledge regarding the method of exotic introduction.m Second,
the greater the scientific scrutiny of ecosystems and their changes, the)
sooner exotic introductions will be identified. Consequently, a
plaintiff's ability to establish the link between defendant's act and the
217. Id. at 789.
218. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 883 (Pa. 1974).
219. Louise Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plaintiffs: Ownership, Use, and Causation
(part II), 17 ENVTL L. REP. 10044, 10045 (1987).
220. See, e.g., Quinnett, 568 A..2d at 788-89.
221. See, eg., Yount, supra note 4, at 51 ("[e]cological explosions... differ from other kinds
of explosions in that they do not make loud noises and do not happen instantaneously")
(quoting CHARLES ELTON, THE ECOLOGY OF INVASIONS BY ANIMALS AND PLANTS" (1958)).
222. See, eg., Alien Species Prevention and -Enforcement Act, supra note 79 and
accompanying text (Act appropriates federal money to discover how exotics are imported into
the United States).
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condition alleged to be a public nuisance is a proof problem which
may be solved by scientific evidence.'
CONCLUSION
As illustrated, the application of old laws and statutes to new
concepts may be troublesome. Society's value system and scientific
knowledge stress the seams of tort law which developed amidst very
different social attitudes. In the past, science and society were
unaware of, or at least unconcerned with, the effects of exotic species.
Today, environmental concerns like exotic species introductions are
at the forefront of social issues, and science has discovered that the
Earth's ecosystems are not indestructible. Consequently, environmen-
tal laws have been drafted to offer solutions and fill gaps existing in
the common law. Nevertheless, current statutes also prove inadequate
because they are relatively narrow and even more rigid in application
than their common law counterparts.
However, public nuisance law is the engine behind most
environmental laws. Its general principles, such as liability for
interfering with public rights, enable it to adapt to peculiar situations.
Furthermore, unlike most environmental laws which command and
control, the tort system allows individuals to choose the most efficient
way to avoid liability. Allowing individuals to determine the most
effective methods of avoiding exotic pollution will produce solutions
which best suit their operations, and will do so more expeditiously
than governmental determination.
Tort law may not be a panacea for the exotics problem because
current science may not be capable of establishing the link between
the exotic manifestation and a defendant's harmful act. Nevertheless,
as scientific sophistication increases, the remedy of public nuisance
could become an effective reality.
223. See Bert Black & David H. Hollander, Unravelling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 U.
BALT. J. ENVrL L. 1 (1993), for an excellent discussion of the current state of law regarding
proof of causation in toxic torts. Toxic torts are analogous to introduction of exotic species
because there is a lag time between the exposure and the manifestation of the "disease" which
makes it difficult to identify the defendant responsible and to determine the substance which
caused the disease. M. STUART MADDEN, ToXIc TORTS DESKBOOK §§ 1.1.2-1.1.3 (1992).
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